Second-Order Diverse in Name Only?: Sovereign Authority in Disaggregated Institutions by Tolson, Franita
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 48 
Issue 3 Honoring the Work of Heather Gerken 
Spring 2013 
Second-Order Diverse in Name Only?: Sovereign Authority in 
Disaggregated Institutions 
Franita Tolson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Franita Tolson, Second-Order Diverse in Name Only?: Sovereign Authority in Disaggregated Institutions, 48 
Tulsa L. Rev. 455 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
SECOND-ORDER DIVERSE IN NAME ONLY?:
SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY IN DISAGGREGATED
INSTITUTIONS
Franita Tolson*
In Second-order Diversityl and Dissenting by Deciding,2 Heather Gerken makes a
powerful argument that the individuals who are usually on the fringe of our governing
institutions - the dissenters, the minorities, the outsiders - exercise power in our ma-
joritarian system that can be undermined if we promote a conception of diversity that
treats all institutions as unitary and identical. 3 In particular, second-order diversity al-
lows electoral minorities to be in the majority in disaggregated institutions such as juries,
school boards, and electoral districts, and it does so without requiring that every institu-
tion mirror the demographics of the underlying population.4 Requiring statistical diversi-
ty, according to Gerken, could sacrifice the control that these groups hold in these dis-
crete political spaces.5 In these spaces, electoral majorities are deprived of decision-
making authority, adding institutional variation to our system of government and, in the
process, creating a framework that better encompasses the entire spectrum of democratic
governance as opposed to prioritizing statistical diversity over all other values.6 Second-
order diversity encourages institutional experimentation by providing a forum for dis-
senters and electoral minorities to exercise power on behalf of the state and engage in
policymaking.7 By giving voice to these values, this theory allows minorities to "dissent
by deciding" because, in some disaggregated institutions, these individuals control the
outcome and influence the broader spectrum of democratic decision-making.8
These articles explore governance in its smallest components and ask a very im-
portant question - what is the best way to allocate policy-making authority to electoral
* Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights, Florida State University College of Law. Special thanks
to Mark Spottswood for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1099 (2005) [hereinafter Second-
Order Diversity].
2. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter Dissenting by
Deciding].
3. See id. at 1747; Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1105.
4. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1102 ("The notion of 'second-order diversity,' proposed
here, posits that democracy sometimes benefits from having decisionmaking bodies that do not mirror the un-
derlying population, but instead encompass a wide range of compositions. Second-order diversity involves var-
iation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them.").
5. See id. at 1107-08.
6. Id. at 1108.
7. See, e.g., id.
8. Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1748.
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minorities so that they too can exercise meaningful power in our system? Relatedly, tak-
ing a micro-level view of governance also raises interesting questions about whether the
power that electoral minorities retain within disaggregated institutions and exercise on
behalf of the state is truly sovereign and/or autonomous, and, more importantly, if it has
to be. Gerken believes that, in these limited spheres, dissenters can constitute local ma-
jorities and make their dissent visible in ways that are denied to them in traditional ma-
joritarian spaces.9 As a result, she pushes against "hard" federalism, which is the tradi-
tional conception of the states and the federal government as being sovereign within their
respective regulatory spheres and would seem to require the existence of a "formal en-
clave" in order to protect the decisions of dissenters.10 Nevertheless, expressing dissent
through the governing mechanisms of the state seems to mandate that dissenters have at
least some variation of sovereign authority in order to distinguish dissenting by deciding
from conventional dissent.11 Even if we step back from sovereignty as the core of our
federal system, as Gerken does in much of her work, and make it peripheral to under-
standing the power that minorities exercise in disaggregated institutions, there still has to
be some insulation of their decision-making in order to make the power that they exer-
cise in these domains meaningful and enduring.12 If the decisions of dissenters are easily
overturned or dismissed because they are outside of the mainstream, this would under-
mine many of the normative benefits that second-order diversity provides.
In this short critique of Gerken's work, I argue that the state has to accord defer-
ence to the decisions of electoral minorities in disaggregated institutions so that the au-
thority they exercise in these spheres can be meaningful and contribute to the broad spec-
trum of democratic ideals that exist within our system of governance. While this
deference does not have to be sovereign in a formal sense, at the very least, electoral mi-
norities must be able to act with a significant amount of autonomy in making decisions
within these enclaves. 13 Gerken actively rejects this assertion and expends a great deal of
effort to illustrate why our traditional notion of federalism and its rigid division of au-
thority is ill-equipped to protect dissenters within our political system.14 However, given
that the animating premise behind second-order diversity is to increase the likelihood
that dissenters can influence democratic output and decision-making, it is impossible to
escape the notions of sovereignty and autonomy that animate federalism doctrine in de-
termining what it means to exercise authority on behalf of the state, even in the context
9. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1148.
10. See Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1782, 1784 ("Because most disaggregated institutions
where dissenting by deciding occurs are at the lower end of the political hierarchy, the chance to register dis-
sent through a decision in such contexts emerges ad hoc, either by the grace of the majority or out of practical
necessity.").
11. Cf id. at 1784 ("Central decisionmakers, of necessity, must cede some discretion to lower-level deci-
sionmakers to interpret and implement the majority's decrees. And in the gap between the rule and the interpre-
tation lies room for would-be dissenters to express their own preferences and views-a de facto space for dis-
senting by deciding.").
12. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-30 (2006).
13. See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65
VAND. L. REv. 1195 (2012) (defining autonomy as "a right to make policy and exercise regulatory authority,"
which, although expansive, is not true sovereignty because there is always the threat of intervention from a
higher authority).
14. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1109.
456 Vol. 48:455
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss3/4
SECOND-ORDER DIVERSE IN NA ME ONLY?
of disaggregated institutions. But, in the interest of promoting the normative ideals un-
derlying Gerken's theory,15 it is clear that the level of authority that must be present
should vary depending on the institution rather than embracing the rigid notions of sov-
ereignty and formally delineated spaces underlying "hard" federalism.
In this essay, I explore this premise and conclude that promoting second-order di-
versity as a normative ideal may not require the same level of sovereign authority that we
typically think of in the context of "Our Federalism," where entities have final policy-
making authority in a specific regulatory sphere. At the very least, it requires a strong
conception of autonomy where electoral minorities have plenary authority to which the
state defers, allowing them to exercise meaningful power in their respective subunits. 16
By focusing on disaggregated institutions such as juries, county commissions, and elec-
toral districts as Gerken does in much of her work,17 this essay analyzes the extent to
which the decision-making authority of electoral minorities is insulated when they are
exercising power on behalf of the state. The goal of this analysis is to ensure that having
a normative commitment to second-order diversity means more than simply dissenters
having power in name only, but it does so within the context of a sovereignty/autonomy
based framework that is considerably more flexible than that offered by "hard" federal-
ism theory.
PART 1. UNDERSTANDING MINORITY "POWER" IN DISAGGREGATED INSTITUTIONS
Gerken's work is groundbreaking in many respects, but to the extent that there is
any disagreement between us, it is her attempt to divorce conceptions of minority power
from any considerations of sovereignty and autonomy, which is the framework that
commonly defines the contours of governing authority. Nonetheless, any attempt to paint
this as a weakness in her work is a difficult undertaking because Gerken's refusal to be
confined by traditional understandings of how power is allocated in our system is what
makes her work extraordinary. Yet, I remain convinced that it is important to
acknowledge that considerations of sovereignty and autonomy continue to dictate what
"power" means and how "power" is exercised in practice. In fact, in attempting to under-
stand the allocation of power between the majority and electoral minorities, it is not nec-
essary to engage in a full scale rejection of traditional federalism principles, as Gerken
does.18
In many ways, federalism theory has had to evolve in order to accommodate the
practical realities of the system. The power of the state has significantly diminished over
time, leading its authority to be preempted or, alternatively, shared by the federal gov-
15. Id. at 1104 (arguing that second-order diversity "provides a strategy for allocating power to electoral
minorities that serves as a counterweight to the influence model that otherwise dominates our system;" "creates
a distinct type of political space, one where members of the majority experience what it is like to be deprived of
comfort;" "provides a richer, more textured view of the democratic order ... [b]y avoiding [a] push to the mid-
dle in every case;" and "allows us to take an experimental approach to designing decisionmaking institutions").
16. See Tolson, supra note 13, at 1200-01 (defining sovereignty in this manner); see also Andrzej Ra-
paczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV.
341, 342 (same).
17. See Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1748; Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1112-17.
18. See Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1782-83.
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ernment in many domains. 19 As this section shows, despite the evolution of federalism
both in theory and practice, there are still lessons to be learned from traditional federal-
ism doctrine and its reliance on sovereign regulatory spheres as its core animating prin-
ciple. Namely, that some level of authority, even if it is ultimately less than sovereignty,
remains vital in order to avoid the outcome that most federalism theorists would view as
the worst case scenario: the concentration of governmental power in the hands of a ty-
rannical majority. This section concludes by drawing on local government law, where
localities exercise power on behalf of the state that is subject to preemption in much the
same way as authority exercised by other disaggregated institutions. This example pro-
vides a concrete illustration of why sovereignty and autonomy, in some form, remain
important in understanding minority power, and by implication, Gerken's theory of sec-
ond-order diversity.
Federalism-All-the- Way-Down, Second-Order Diversity, and the Challenge of
Longstanding Assumptions in Federalism Theory
In arguing that there must be sufficient space for dissent, Gerken criticizes the fed-
eralism model as "too limited a strategy for creating space for decisional dissent."20 In
her view, the federalism model poses two problems as an institutional structure capable
of furthering the type of dissent that she envisions: "hard federalism provides de jure
protection for decisional dissent, whereas many examples of dissenting by deciding arise
de facto," and "as a prescriptive matter, there will sometimes be better institutional strat-
egies for promoting the values associated with dissenting by deciding that do not depend
on the notion of enclave." 2 1
Second-order diversity is premised on the idea that, in resolving questions of insti-
tutional design and promoting heterogeneity among institutions, there must be some con-
sideration of the tradeoff between allowing minorities to influence a broad range of deci-
sions or dictating the outcome in a few.22 From Gerken's perspective, the rigid structures
19. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2010) [herein-
after Federalism All the Way Down] ("Academics argue that sovereignty is in short supply in 'Our Federalism.'
They insist that the formal protections sovereignty affords are unnecessary for achieving federalism's ends.").
In this piece, I refer to "autonomy" as a weaker form of sovereignty in order to reflect that these groups have
broad plenary authority to use the power of the state even though they may lack the final policymaking authori-
ty that I argue is the hallmark of true sovereignty. See Tolson, supra note 13; see also Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1, 14 (2004) (noting that sovereignty and autonomy are
often conflated in federalism doctrine).
20. Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1782; see also Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1128-
29. Gerken observes that federalism can "provide[] a strategy for diffusing majority power" but that second-
order diversity, by focusing on disaggregated institutions,
[S]trikes a different compromise with majoritarianism. Federalism hinges on the existence of state
sovereigns, autonomous realms where the state decisionmaker is preeminent. The disaggregated in-
stitutions that are the focus of this Article are quite different. These decisionmaking bodies tend to
be charged with applying or implementing the law enacted by the polity (for example, juries apply-
ing the law handed down by the state legislature, or school committees implementing state law), and
their governing authority does not exist separate and apart from the sovereign's. Their decisionmak-
ing power is thus bounded by the majority's choices.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
21. Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1783.
22. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1105. According to Gerken:
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of federalism stymie this process.2 3 But in trying to understand the tradeoffs between in-
fluence and control, it is also important to entertain questions about how much authority
and power electoral minorities should have in disaggregated institutions in order to make
the tradeoff worthwhile. In addressing this question, federalism doctrine has something
to teach us about the tension between sovereignty, or when an entity has final policy-
making authority in a specific regulatory sphere, and autonomy, which is the positive use
of governmental power.24 Scholars have split on how much sovereignty is needed in or-
der to further the goals of federalism, but in advocating for variation among institutions
that allows minorities to exercise "power," Gerken should not be so quick to dismiss all
types of formerly bounded authority in order to protect the power that dissenters exercise
within these institutions.25 This power may be a weaker form of sovereignty than that
typically promoted by federalism scholars and the Supreme Court, but it is still a type of
autonomy premised on plenary authority not easily disturbed by the state so as to lend
credibility to and place the power of the state behind decisions made by dissenters.
To understand this distinction between sovereignty and autonomy, it is useful to
draw on Ernie Young's work on the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution, which dis-
cusses the tension that exists between sovereignty and autonomy.26 Young argues that
the primary distinction between the majority and the dissenters in the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions, many of which were decided in a five-to-four-split, is that the Jus-
[W]hile second-order diversity grants electoral minorities control over some decisions, the tradeoff
is that electoral minorities lose the chance to influence a broader set of decisions. Although the
tradeoff between influence and control is a well-worn debate with regard to unitary institutions like
legislatures, there is something new to be said about that debate because of the unique way it plays
out in the context of disaggregated institutions. We find a similar set of tradeoffs embedded in the
other arguments relating to second-order diversity. The diffuse participatory benefits associated
with turning the tables on the majority must be balanced against a discrete set of participatory costs.
The benefits of visibility must be offset against the costs of variation, the loss of uniformity that oc-
curs when electoral minorities have the power to issue outlier decisions. And the values associated
with cycling [or varying the composition of decisionmaking bodies] should be weighed against the
costs associated with endless experimentation, with the decision to make variation and conflict a
permanent feature of any institutional structure.
Id.
23. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1128-29.
24. See Tolson, supra note 13, at 1199; Young, supra note 19, at 14 ("Although our Framers 'split the atom
of sovereignty,' shattering the notion that political authority must remain undivided, this notion of unaccounta-
bility - that the sovereign is subject to no law - remains central."); Id. (arguing that autonomy suggests "a gov-
emnment doing things - making policy and carrying it out, for the benefit of its citizens - and not simply shield-
ing itself from threats").
25. See Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 19, at 8 (arguing that there are parts of "Our Federalism"
that do not turn on a sovereignty account but still allow minorities to participate effectively in governance).
According to Gerken:
In these areas, institutional arrangements promote voice, not exit; integration, not autonomy; inter-
dependence, not independence. Minorities do not rule separate and apart from the national system,
and the power they wield is not their own. Minorities are instead part of a complex amalgam of state
and local actors who administer national policy. And the power minorities wield is that of the serv-
ant, not the sovereign; the insider, not the outsider. They enjoy a muscular form of voice-the pow-
er not just to complain about national policy, but to help set it. Here power dynamics are fluid; mi-
nority rule is contingent, limited, and subject to reversal by the national majority; and rebellious
decisions can originate even from banally administrative units. I use the term "federalism-all-the-
way-down" to describe the institutional arrangements that our constitutional account too often miss-
es-where minorities rule without sovereignty.
Id. at 7-8.
26. Young, supra note 19, at 13-15.
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tices embrace differing notions of state sovereignty.27 This distinction allowed the Court
to embrace categorical rules that strongly favor state sovereignty while simultaneously
dismissing state regulatory autonomy.28 Notably, in National League of Cities v. Usury,
the Court invalidated portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act that regulated the wages
and hours of state employees on the grounds that the provision undermined the tradition-
al aspects of state sovereignty.29 Although National League of Cities was overruled nine
years later, this notion that there are areas of state sovereignty that the federal govern-
ment cannot invade had a rebirth in the 1990s. In United States v. Morrison, for example,
the Court invalidated the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act as
exceeding the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause because Congress
tried to regulate noneconomic activity, which is traditionally the role of the states. 30 Sim-
ilarly, in United States v. Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act
based on this same economic/noneconomic distinction.31 Yet the same pro-state sover-
eignty Justices in the majority in Lopez and Morrison have also been consistent in find-
ing that state law is preempted by federal law in certain circumstances. 32 The end result
is, according to Young, that the "Rehnquist Court's strong tendency has been to promote
a vision of state sovereignty that bears only an attenuated link to the viability of state
governance." 33
One possible explanation for the Rehnquist Court's willingness to protect state
sovereignty while affording less protection to the governance prerogatives central to state
autonomy is because the Court views sovereignty as raising a qualitatively different
question than issues of autonomy. In other words, the Court ropes off certain areas com-
pletely from federal intervention - hence the economic/noneconomic distinction in
Morrison and Lopez34 - while recognizing that the state does not have absolute immun-
ity from federal norms in determining how to use and delegate its authority within other
regulatory areas. 35 Sometimes this distinction is meaningless in practice. For example,
the Court has held that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to
its commerce authority but essentially allows Congress to place conditions on the receipt
of federal funds that achieve the same aim.36 But this distinction does say something
about the nature of state authority, that there are times in which the state's power is abso-
lute and other times when it is not; even in the latter situation, the state still exercises
27. Id. at 23-24.
28. Id. at 24-25.
29. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976).
30. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-19 (2000).
31. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-67 (1995).
32. Young, supra note 19, at 31 (describing preemption cases as "the quintessential autonomy cases" be-
cause they "concern whether the states can regulate third parties within their own jurisdiction, pursuant to their
own view of the public interest, or whether that authority will be displaced by federal control"); see also Lo-
rillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550-51 (2001) (holding that state regulations for tobacco adver-
tisements were preempted by federal law).
33. Young, supra note 19, at 31.
34. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 541 U.S. at 564-65.
35. See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 550-51.
36. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (holding the Affordable Care
Act as beyond the scope of Congress' commerce authority because the law compels individuals not already in
commerce to purchase a product but is valid pursuant to Congress' power to tax).
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broad power despite the ever-present threat of preemption by the federal government.37
Similarly, when the state delegates authority to local government institutions like
juries, county commissions, and school boards, this authority does not have to be based
on pure sovereignty but still can be autonomous and meaningful. Indeed, despite the con-
stant threat of state intervention, the fact that individuals within these institutions retain
"power," in one form or another, is beyond dispute. Disaggregated institutions are un-
doubtedly still components of the state, which we generally view as sovereign.38 To ar-
gue that this sovereignty is lost when the state delegates some of its power to smaller
units is analytically problematic. It could be, however, that the power takes a different
form the further down the ladder it goes. Federalism is about more than sovereignty and
substance; federalism is also about recognizing that there are different mechanisms to
delegate power from the center, and it can be done in a way that does not leave the pe-
riphery powerless. Thus, the "hard federalism" that Gerken warns about in her scholar-
ship is actually much more amenable to being used in a second-order diversity frame-
work than it originally appears because federalism can allow dissenters on the fringes to
retain significant decision-making authority that does not have to mirror the power exer-
cised at the state level. 39
Framing disaggregated institutions as autonomous bodies using positive govern-
mental authority is also consistent with many of the ideals of "hard" federalism.40 Pro-
tecting decisions made by electoral minorities, even at the sub-state level, can help pre-
serve the balance of federalism between the states and the federal government because it
is a key component of how the state has chosen to allocate authority within its own bor-
ders.4 1 To the extent that federalism is also about protecting individual liberty, there is
room for second-order diversity in traditional federalism doctrine because it allows elec-
toral minorities to exercise their self-expression through decisions that influence the
broad range of societal preferences. 42
Given these factors, the reality is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to get away
from some account of sovereignty or autonomy in federalism theory altogether and, by
implication, in trying to understand the power that dissenters exercise in disaggregated
institutions. I do not mean to suggest that the fit between federalism, second-order diver-
37. See Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 859,
871-72 (2010) (arguing that states retain broad authority over the time, place, and manner of elections because
Congress has rarely exercised its authority to alter or change state electoral regulations).
38. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1162 (noting that "second-order diversity grants electoral
minorities the power not just to articulate their views, but to resolve democratic controversies in the best way
they see fit").
39. Young, supra note 19, at 15 (discussing how sovereignty and autonomy overlap). See also Second-
Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1161 (arguing that the ability of electoral minorities to issue outlier decisions
is the "primary benefit afforded by variation in democratic outputs").
40. See e.g., Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1790-91.
41. See Young, supra note 19, at 16 (noting that the "rules of 'process federalism' derive their force and
structure from the need to prevent malfunctions in the political and institutional mechanisms that ordinarily act
to preserve the federal balance in the absence of judicial intervention").
42. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) ("One fairly can dispute whether our federalist sys-
tem has been quite as successful in checking government abuse as Hamilton promised, but there is no doubt
about the design. If this 'double security' is to be effective, there must be a proper balance between the States
and the Federal Government. These twin powers will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible. In the
tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.").
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sity, and dissenting by deciding is a comfortable one. In many ways, Gerken's work
highlights the tension that emerges when we try to transplant our traditional understand-
ing of power and authority into a context in which those factors take a back seat to other
goals that can be realized through the second-order diversity framework. For example,
Gerken is undoubtedly correct that dissent often emerges de facto and in nontraditional
spaces.43 She is also correct that rigid application of a fully theorized federalism model
could constrain rather than promote the dissent that she views as valuable. 44 Yet many of
the examples that Gerken relies on in her work are examples in which dissenters exercise
the power of the state, despite their overarching goal of using the subunit as a medium
for dissent - a jury that renders a verdict in a case; voters in a majority-minority district
casting a vote for their preferred candidate 45 - are all examples of formally bounded
spaces that can promote the diversity of viewpoint with which Gerken is concerned. Yet,
unless these units can operate with some level of autonomy, a concept that plays a signif-
icant role in "hard" federalism theory, the effectiveness of their dissent is significantly
undermined.
Only in the most extreme cases can dissenting by deciding effectively operate
without some type of autonomy that can effectively insulate decision-making. For exam-
ple, Gerken points to the decision of San Francisco city officials to marry gay and lesbi-
an couples and a school board mandating the teaching of creationism as "dissenting by
decision" because both stand as examples of those with a minority viewpoint using pow-
er allocated to them by the state to express dissent.46 In pointing to these examples,
Gerken is absolutely right that removing sovereignty has allowed us to "push federalism
all the way down" and observe how minorities exercise power in subunits and influence
national debates despite the absence of sovereignty. 47 However, for outlier decisions that
do not trigger a national dialogue or that may involve more pedestrian policy matters,
autonomy can be important in ensuring that dissenters have meaningful and lasting au-
thority in these spheres.
From my view, the absence of autonomy can lead to decisions by dissenters being
overturned or disturbed by others too quickly and too summarily. This may not be entire-
ly problematic for Gerken, who focuses more on the importance of "voice" and less on
the importance of power.48 Indeed, there is much to commend in this argument. In the
same sex-marriage controversy, the city officials in San Francisco undoubtedly pushed
the national conversation forward because of their decision to marry these couples, even
if the decision was short-lived before being overturned. 4 9 Gerken argues that the deci-
sion by city officials to marry same-sex couples gave us, as a nation, "a concrete prac-
tice, not just an abstract issue, to debate." 50 Although there is some truth to this, the abil-
43. Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1783-84.
44. Id. at 1784.
45. See, e.g., id. at 1787; Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1159-60.
46. Id. at 1748.
47. Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 19, at 8.
48. Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1793.
49. See Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 19, at 9 ("Minority rule without sovereignty is more at-
tractive because it allows the national majority to reverse a decision if it is willing to spend the necessary polit-
ical capital to do so.").
50. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1162.
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ity of the lower court to halt the actions of city officials a mere thirty days after the first
couple received their license is striking and important. 5 1
Perhaps this outcome - the decision by a court to stop what would arguably be an
"outlier" decision at the time - was unavoidable. According to the California Supreme
Court, there was no controlling precedent for reading California's historical definition of
marriage as extending beyond a union between a man and a woman.52 More importantly,
the state legislature arguably did not intend that San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's
discretion would extend to granting licenses to same-sex couples. 53 But the reality is that
the mayor had an advantage of timing in moving the ball forward on the same-sex mar-
riage issue, forcing the hand of many states and localities into confronting it head on.54
His defiance (and willingness to be the outlier vis-a-vis other municipalities) brought the
same-sex marriage issue front and center, showing the value of second-order diversity as
a mechanism for dissent.
At the same time, the debate over same-sex marriage also highlights the extent to
which the effectiveness of dissent can be tied to the scope of the authority delegated to
actors in disaggregated institutions by the state, a limitation that could stifle dissent in the
context of an issue that is not as politically contested as same-sex marriage. 55 A court
overturned Mayor Newsome's decision within thirty days so it had very little preceden-
tial value, although Newsome was successful in triggering a national debate. 56 Gerken
would arguably see this as a win-win because in her view, these forums provide a vehicle
for dissent while simultaneously allowing the majority to overturn minority decisions
that are too far outside of the mainstream. 57 But for disaggregated institutions that issue
less controversial outlier decisions, circumventing their ability to express dissent by nar-
rowing the scope of their authority or summarily overturning their decisions can raise
serious issues to the extent that we care about giving these groups both voice and power.
Much like Mayor's Newsom's actions, similar concerns about "outlier decisions" can be
raised with respect to the school board that teaches creationism or the jury that gives a
light sentence because it opposes the state's harsh sentencing regime. 58 But we have to
balance our ability to subject these decisions to meaningful oversight so as to not under-
mine majoritarian preferences or our normative commitment to second-order diversity.
To avoid this outcome, the decisions of minorities in disaggregated institutions cannot be
51. See id
52. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("California's historical definition
of marriage does not deprive individuals of a vested fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect
class....").
53. Id. at 705.
54. See Rona Marech, The Battle Over Same Sex Marriage: One Year Later, Both Sides Claim Victory, but
Courts Will Decide, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 12, 2005, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/THE-
BATTLE-OVER-SAME-SEX-MARRIAGE-One-Year-Later-2731442.php ("[Mayor] Newsom's decision to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples spurred similar actions around the country and ignited a national
debate. And over the next 12 months, gay couples legally wed in Massachusetts, Canada's high court gave gay
marriage a legal thumbs-up, 11 states passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, and al-
most twice as many states prepared to follow suit.").
55. See Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1748-49.
56. See Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 686-87; Marech, supra note 54.
57. Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1756.
58. Id at 1748-49.
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rendered impotent and without the force of law. 59 Second-order diversity is not only
about voice, it is also (unavoidably) about power.60
Why Sovereignty and Autonomy Are Still Important: Lessons From Local Government
I should be clear that this essay is not an attempt to force sovereignty back into the
core of Gerken's theory of federalism nor her work on second-order diversity and dis-
sent; rather, it is to present an alternate account of why sovereignty, even if in a weak
form more analogous to autonomy, is still relevant to understanding the power that mi-
norities exercise in disaggregated institutions. In particular, the constitutional structure
was designed to preserve state authority in certain policy-making spheres while delegat-
ing enumerated powers to the federal government.61 Less attention has been given to
what occurs when the state delegates some of its authority to subunits in order to carry
out official duties.62 Drawing an analogy to the state-local government relationship sheds
light on the relationship between electoral minorities and the state because in both situa-
tions you have smaller units exercising state authority.63 As I mentioned in the prior sec-
tion, the state's sovereign authority, even if diluted, does not disappear when the state
cedes some of its authority to local subunits, and this remains true even when we are fo-
cusing on disaggregated institutions as Gerken does.64 Indeed, scholars considered local
governments powerless until this view was challenged in Richard Briffault's ground-
breaking article Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law, in
which he argued that cities have significant formal legal power and informal discretion-
ary authority that gives them a great deal of discretion over certain policy areas. 65 While
the scope of local authority is somewhat narrow because such governments exist at the
pleasure of the state, they are still quite powerful by virtue of the fact that the state has
59. A recent example would be Governor Bob McDonnell's decision to force the Virginia board of health
to apply regulations passed by the legislature to existing abortion clinics after the board had decided to exempt
existing clinics and only apply the regulations to future clinics. The regulations are onerous and will likely have
the effect of shutting down all of the abortion clinics in Virginia. See Jim Nolan, Bob McDonnell Quietly Certi-
fies Revised Abortion Clinic Regulations, HUFFINGTON PosT (Jan. 2, 2013, 7:30 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/bob-mcdonnell-abortion-clinics-n2394391 html.
60. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1104, 1163.
61. See John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27, 29
(1998).
62. See, e.g., id. ("Broadly stated, the framers understood the Constitution to grant the national government
primarily those powers involving foreign relations. The states would retain primary jurisdiction over almost all
other domestic matters, such as taxation, judicial administration and law enforcement, and social and moral
legislation. In defending the Constitution from Anti-federalist claims that the Necessary and Proper Clause
gave the national government unlimited powers, Madison declared that federal powers 'will be exercised prin-
cipally on external objects, as war, peace, negociation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of
taxation will for the most part be connected."') (internal citation omitted).
63. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1163-64.
64. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (noting that "[tihe original form of home rule amendment treated the home rule
municipality as an imperium in imperio, a state within a state, possessed of the full police power with respect to
municipal affairs and also enjoying a correlative degree of immunity from state legislative interference."). To-
day, according to Professor Briffault, forty-one states use some form of home rule in which local municipalities
are granted significant authority by the state. Id. at 10-11 (citing MELvtN B. HILL, STATE LAWS GOVERNING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 43 (1978)).
65. Compare Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062-67 (1980), with
Briffault, supra note 64.
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delegated extensive authority to these municipalities. 66 As Professor Briffault observes,
this point often gets lost in the scholarly literature because state legislatures will pass
laws that govern local matters, but many times these laws come at the request of local
governing bodies. 67 Similarly, state courts often intervene on local matters because it is
difficult to separate matters of local concern from subjects that may be of importance to
the state. 68
Even if local governments are circumscribed in their authority, at least to an extent
that we would not describe them as sovereign entities similar in form to the state, 69 they
still retain enough autonomy such that their decision-making enjoys some level of finali-
ty because there is very little intervention from the state.70 While the risk of state inter-
vention is always present, this risk has not inhibited the ability of local governments to
break barriers in a number of policy areas that govern the everyday lives of citizens. As a
result of this deference, local municipalities enjoy an autonomy that helps to promote the
type of experimentation often touted in federalism doctrine. As Professor Briffault has
observed:
Certainly, whatever the technically limited status of local units and their formal
subservience to the state, local governments have wielded substantial lawmaking
power and undertaken important public initiatives. Even during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries-the heyday of Dillon's Rule, the era of plenary
state power and the unsteady beginnings of home rule-American city govern-
ments pioneered in public health, education, parks, libraries, water supply, sanita-
tion and sewage removal, street paving and lighting and mass transit, building the
infrastructure that still serves modem urban centers. City governments owned and
operated public utilities, regulated private utilities, professionalized their admin-
istrations and employment structures and experimented with a broad range of po-
litical and governmental innovations, including the council-manager and commis-
sion forms of government, competitive bidding on public works, planning and
zoning, and nonpartisan elections. This could not have been accomplished without
significant legal power. 71
There are also instances in which local authority has been vindicated in the face of
conflicting state mandates, contrary to the notion that local governments are completely
powerless in the face of state authority.72 Despite this, the absence of pure sovereignty in
66. Briffault, supra note 64, at 8 (discussing Dillion's Rule, a canon of construction for interpreting the
scope of local government authority, under which "local governments may exercise only those powers 'granted
in express words,' or 'those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to, the powers expressly granted,' or
'those essential to the declared objects and purpose of the [municipal] corporation-not simply convenient, but
indispensable') (citation omitted); see also Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Briffault, supra
note 64, at 9 (noting that "Dillion's Rule and the notion of plenary state power are the formal background
norms for state-local relationships") (citation omitted); Frug, supra note 65, at 1112 (arguing that although Dil-
lon's vision of society has been abandoned in most states, "Dillon's statement of the law ... largely remains
intact," still leading courts to construe local government power narrowly).
67. Briffault, supra note 64, at 13.
68. Id. at 13-14.
69. The description of local governments as sovereign is also inapt for other reasons. For example, local
governments are not immune from federal regulation in the same way as states. See Cmty. Commc'ns. Co. v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
70. Briffault, supra note 64, at 15-18.
71. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
72. See, e.g., Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256 (1985); Washington v.
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local governance could also be a benefit for reasons identified in Gerken's scholarship;
namely, that it allows governing majorities to police the outliers, or those localities that
veer so far from the mainstream so as to raise concerns.73 The absence of sovereignty
also allows the state to intervene in order to impose uniform rules over what would oth-
erwise be considered a local matter to address shortcomings in policy and governance.74
For example, disparities in taxable wealth have led to inequities in school funding, an
area traditionally governed by local government.75 Because courts treat school funding
as a local issue, many of the challenges to the tax schemes used by these governments
have failed even though a uniform system of funding provided by the state may be a bet-
ter solution to the problems of financial inequity among schools.76 This is one instance
in which the local government's lack of sovereignty should have probably dictated a dif-
ferent outcome.
Nevertheless, the autonomous authority of local government, while not always ide-
al and sometimes counterproductive, still serves as a useful example for understanding
the authority that smaller entities have when they are acting with the power of the state.77
As the school funding example illustrates, the willingness of courts to disturb local deci-
sion-making often turns on the background norm of whether it is an area traditionally
regulated by local bodies; in other areas, local decision-making is often disturbed by con-
trary state rules and regulations with little recourse available for these municipalities.
Yet the ability to act in the name of the state, with the power of the state, lends credibil-
ity to the decision-making of local municipalities in a way that is important for giving
voice to local interests. 79 I posit that this remains true even if we go beyond the state-
local relationship, to disaggregated institutions like juries, county commissions, and elec-
toral districts, which I discuss in the next section. These institutions, to the extent that we
are willing to insulate their decision-making from interference, can also promote dissent
and serve as the "laboratories of democracy" often touted in federalism theory. 80
PART II. GIVING "POWER" TO DISSENT IN DISAGGREGATED INSTITUTIONS
As the prior section shows, sovereignty does not disappear when states delegate
authority to smaller parcels, although arguably the form of authority is sufficiently au-
tonomous to allow local entities to dictate policy outcomes and act independently of the
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). In each case, the Supreme Court found the state statute at issue
was unconstitutional.
73. See Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1756.
74. See id. at 1773.
75. See Briffault, supra note 64, at 19-21.
76. Id. at 27 ("Most of these courts candidly acknowledged the existence of substantial spending differ-
ences among school districts, which they recognized were largely attributable to differences in local taxable
wealth. But they held that interlocal wealth and spending differences did not undermine the legitimacy of the
state delegation of responsibility for the provision and funding of basic public services to local governments.
Instead, unequal levels of local services and taxation were deemed characteristic of the American system of
local government.") (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. Cahill, 385 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976); Buse v. Smith,
247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976).
77. See Briffault, supra note 64, at 81.
78. Id. at 39.
79. See id. at 8, 15.
80. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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state. Moreover, the idea that the decisions of disaggregated institutions should have a
certain amount of insulation from state interference is consistent with federalism doc-
trine. Drawing on the examples that Gerken relies on in her work - in particular, juries,
county commissions, and electoral districts8 1 - I argue that the absence of autonomy
significantly undermines the ability of electoral minorities to give power to their dissent.
Juries and the Tradeoff between Influence and Control
Gerken argues that there is value in having a jury that is second-order diverse; that,
because of random assignment, there will be a significant number of juries in which mi-
norities are sizable enough to dictate the outcome.82 The second-order diversity frame-
work forces minorities to determine "whether they want to influence the decisions ren-
dered by a lot of juries-for instance, soften all verdicts a bit-or control the decisions
rendered by a few." 83 Yet this analysis is incomplete for a couple of reasons. The first is
that there are rarely any jury trials in our modem system.84 As a result, the opportunity
for minorities to "dissent by deciding" is significantly limited in this context. 85
Second, for those jury trials that do occur, Gerken does not adequately consider the
extent to which the jury's discretion is constrained by the judge. Like other disaggregat-
ed institutions, the jury has evolved and as it has become more representative, its authori-
ty has also diminished. During colonial times, trial judges were prohibited from exer-
cising "coercive" power over the jury; thus, judges did not give jury instructions and had
limited ability to comment on the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Moreover,
evidentiary rules were more liberal, allowing a significant amount of information to
reach the jury that would be out of bounds in modem times. In some states, juries also
had the ability to question witnesses. 89
The modem jury is significantly more limited in its ability to perform an active
role in adjudication. 90 As one commentator noted, the jury no longer resolves issues of
both law and fact, like colonial juries; instead, the judge plays more of a role in "seeking
81. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1103-04.
82. Id.at 1112-13.
83. Id. at 1139.
84. See, e.g., FLA. BAR, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE DECLINE IN JURY TRIALS
(2011), available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsflAttachments/2CC9BF48C44964428525
79950050E988/$FILE/final%20report%20jury/o20special.pdf.
85. One possible bright spot is that settlement occurs in the shadow of trial. As a result, the likely decision
of local jurors could have some influence on potential settlement. However, to the extent that dissenters hand
down outlier decisions in jury trials, one of the potential benefits of second-order diversity, their influence on
settlement is, by definition, limited because it does not represent the mainstream, or likely decision of local
jurors.
86. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1112.
87. Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
377, 439-44 (1996).
88. Id. at 444.
89. See Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed to Question Witnesses
During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 117 (1991). Note, however, that some states are starting to experiment with
juror questioning of witnesses as a reform of the trial process. See, e.g., Brian Skoloff, Jurors ask Jodi Arias
About Religion, Memory, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/
articles/2013/03/06/arias-to-answer-juror-questions-in-murder-case. If adopted, this could help increase the
power of the jury relative to the judge.
90. See Smith, supra note 87, at 474.
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truth" and deciding law than the jury because of the court's power to issue instructions to
the jury, direct the verdict, weigh evidence, and assess the credibility of witnesses.91
These changes occurred as the jury became more representative of the underlying popu-
lace. 92 During the colonial period, most states limited jury service to qualified voters, a
category usually defined as white, male property owners. Early in the nineteenth centu-
ry, the increasing power of the jury corresponded to the rise of mass politics and the
widespread expansion of suffrage beyond freeholders. 94 Even as the right to vote became
more universal, however, the jury continued to be a place of exclusion for women and
minorities. 9 5
During the late nineteenth century, much of the discretion previously possessed by
the jury was delegated to the judge. 9 6 As late as 1851, fifteen states allowed juries to de-
cide questions of law, but this function of both criminal and civil juries was dissolved by
1895.97 Not coincidently, a lot happened in the interim. In the 1860s, Congress passed
laws allowing African Americans to testify in state and federal courts.98 During Recon-
struction, African Americans regularly sat on juries in some southern states. 99 The Civil
Rights Act of 1875 forbade disqualification of jurors on racial grounds, followed by the
1880 Supreme Court decision in Strauder v. West Virginia, which held that the Four-
teenth Amendment rights of an African American defendant were violated because he
was convicted by a jury from which African Americans were excluded on the basis of
race. 100
91. Id; see also R. J. Farley, Instructions to Juries - Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194,
202 (1932) ("In America by the time of the Revolution and for some time thereafter, the power to decide the
law in criminal cases seems to have been almost universally accorded the jury and quite generally, it deter-
mined the law in civil cases.") (citation omitted).
92. See Smith, supra note 87, at 464-65.
93. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61
U. CH. L. REv. 867, 869 (1994).
94. MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 217 (West Publ'g Co. 1936) ("[Iln
the several states the power of the judge became more and more restricted in the era that accompanied the rise
of Andrew Jackson and the reorganized Democratic Party ... with the emphasis shifting more and more to the
jury. In many jurisdictions judges were prevented from commenting on the evidence. In some, juries were
made the judges of law as well as fact."); Larry D. Kramer, The Pace and Cause of Change, 37 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 357 (2004).
95. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 93, at 878 ("The early nineteenth century saw a rapid movement away
from property qualifications and toward universal suffrage for white males, yet the liberalization of voting re-
quirements was not always accompanied by a similar liberalization of requirements for jury service. As this
article will explain in greater detail, the reform of jury qualifications has often lagged behind the reform of
qualifications for voting. In many states, unpropertied white men, African-Americans, and women did not
serve on juries until considerably after they gained the vote.") (citation omitted).
96. Notes and Comments, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 170,
176 (1964) ("On the one hand, the jury's right to decide questions of law, a colonial heritage acknowledged
earlier in the century, was lost. The directed verdict and the special verdict, both methods of limiting the jury's
function to fact-finding, were introduced. On the other hand, attempts were made in a majority of the states to
preclude trial judges from commenting on the evidence. By the end of the [nineteenth] century, jury trial was a
substantially different process from what it had been in the early days of the Republic.") (citation omitted).
97. Smith, supra note 87, at 452.
98. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 93, at 885.
99. Id. at 886.
100. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 93, at 892.
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With the end of Reconstruction, the rights of African Americans to serve on junes
remained unenforced throughout the South until the 1960s.10 1 Women similarly were
excluded from jury service, despite being granted the right to vote in 1919, until their
plight gradually changed in the 1960s and 1970s.102 The jury pool selection mechanism
used by many states during this time period, known as the key-man method, also con-
tributed to the exclusion of women and minorities. 103 Unlike random selection, the key-
man method allowed jury commissioners to tap community leaders ("key men") who
personally recommended individuals, usually white men, for jury service. 104 Women and
minorities began to play a more substantial role in the American jury system after the
adoption of the 1968 Federal Jury Selection and Service Act and the Uniform Jury Selec-
tion and Service Act, both of which eliminated the key-man jury and broadened the po-
tential jury pool, 10 5 as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,106
which constitutionalized the issue of jury selection by prohibiting the use of voir dire to
exclude jurors on the basis of race.
As juries became more integrated, their power was significantly circumscribed in
state courts, in Supreme Court precedents, and ultimately, under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. For example, Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that "[t]he court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a spe-
cial written finding upon each issue of fact."1 07 This rule has been criticized for
"erod[ing] the power of the jury" by decreasing the likelihood that legal questions will be
submitted to the jury.108 Similarly, the directed verdict in Rule 50 provides another
mechanism by which judges can circumvent the power of the jury because the rule al-
lows the judge to enter a verdict before the claims can go to the jury, or alternatively, to
overturn the jury verdict at the end of trial based on the sufficiency of the evidence.109
The Supreme Court has acquiesced in the Federal Rules' delegation of power from jury
to judge, holding that the jury should follow judicial instructions on the law in criminal
trials; 1 10 that the jury's domain is factual, not legal; and that the jury's judgment can
be bypassedll2 - certainly not the jury system as it existed in 1791.
101. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 93, at 894.
102. Compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961) (denying that there were "any arbitrary [or] systemat-
ic exclusions" of jurors in an all-male jury in a woman's murder trial), with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
537 (1975) (stating that "it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded to given auto-
matic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that criminal jury venires are almost totally male").
103. See VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 53-54 (1986).
104. Id.
105. Developments in the Law - The Civil Jury: III. Jury Selection and Composition, I 10 HARv. L. REV.
1408, 1451-53 (1997).
106. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a)(1).
108. Smith, supra note 87, at 486-88.
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)-(b).
110. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). But see Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury
"Nullification ": When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239 (1992-
1993).
111. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that juries no longer retain
the power to acquit despite instructions received from the judge on the law).
112. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) ("[T]here is no federally recognized right to a criminal
trial before a judge sitting alone, but a defendant can ... in some instances waive his right to a trial by jury.");
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (holding that a criminal defendant has the power to waive his
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The fact that the jury is more representative, but less powerful, matters in making
the cost/benefit analysis that the second-order diversity framework commands. To the
extent that we care about jury verdicts in the aggregate and using outliers to influence
verdicts overall,113 juries have limited ability to independently express dissent because
of constraints imposed by both judges and statutes. Perhaps what this means is that, in
determining the tradeoff between influence and control, we should tinker with the rules
that govern juries in order to make them more autonomous and independent of the judge.
One such possibility may be employing a higher standard of proof before a judge can
disturb a jury verdict. Or maybe the value of jury autonomy provides another justifica-
tion for statutes that prohibit jury nullification, a law that exist in almost every state.1 14
Or we may ultimately conclude that because the power of the jury has been significantly
limited, its ability to influence jury verdicts in the aggregate is not worth sacrificing the
control that electoral minorities can exercise in a certain subset of jury trials. At the very
least, such discussions illustrate the importance of jury autonomy to the second-order di-
versity framework.
Pushing the second-order diversity framework to assessing the micro-level rules
that apply in a jury setting could also be beneficial for considering proposed jury re-
forms. The framework of second-order diversity highlights many of the problems with
jury rules raised by commentators that have been exacerbated by the delegation of au-
thority from the judge to the jury.115 For example, Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure and Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the judge to
instruct the jury either at the close of the evidence, after closing arguments, or both.1 16
Some commentators have advocated for altering these rules to allow for "preinstruction,"
where the judge advises the jury at the outset of the trial because it allows the jury to as-
sess the evidence with an eye towards the factors that the judge identified in his or her
instructions and it helps jurors to link the evidence to the relevant issues. 117 But the dis-
advantages of preinstruction, particularly when considered in light of the second-order
diversity framework, are significant:
First, to the extent that jurors exhibit tendencies to settle on a verdict early in the
trial-preinstruction may exacerbate this tendency. Second, preinstruction may
focus all, or at least most, of the jurors on the same issues and testimony. To the
extent that the deliberative process is enriched by a diversity of perspectives and
attitudes, that rocess may be diminished by the homogenization encouraged by
preinstruction. 18
right to a jury trial).
113. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1139.
114. New Hampshire recently passed a statute allowing defense counsel in criminal proceedings to inform
the jury of its right to nullify laws. See Michael Suede, Jury Nullification In New Hampshire Becomes Reality,
POLICYMIC (July 2012), http://www.policymic.com/articles/10603/jury-nullification-in-new-hampshire-
becomes-reality.
115. See Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District
Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 437-39 (1985).
116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30; FED. R. Civ. P.51.
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Since second-order diversity places a premium on the heterogeneity that emerges
from the random assignment ofjurors, then preinstruction, which encourages jurors to be
homogenous in their view of the evidence, may not adequately value this benefit. It also
narrows the window of dissent in which minorities can rally their fellow jurors into see-
ing things from their vantage point, in essence minimizing the opportunity for dissent. A
similar assessment could be made for other jury reforms and whether proposed changes
adequately respect the values of second-order diversity.
To be sure, it is difficult to adequately consider second-order diversity in this con-
text because of the limitations of our jury trial system discussed above. 119 Unlike local
governmental units, the jury's lack of autonomy and the infrequency ofjury trials overall
make it difficult for these disaggregated institutions to provide a forum for meaningful
dissent. Moreover, the reforms that may need to occur, some of which I highlight above,
may not be worth the cost to the system as a whole, particularly if we view judges as
more steady and reliable than juries.120 There may be a higher likelihood that minorities
will be able to exercise "power" through dissent in forums such as county commissions
and electoral districts- a contention I explore below.
Autonomy in Other Types ofDisaggregated Institutions
Gerken does a great job of describing how second-order diversity can inform the
debate surrounding the costs and benefits of choosing certain electoral forms over others.
She highlights the fact that creating districts and other governing units is about more than
electing representatives who influence legislative outcomes; it is also about electing rep-
resentatives who can distribute goods and services back into the district.121 Indeed, sit-
ting on the board of a county commission or being the majority in a legislative district
can help minorities in a few ways including agenda setting, using issues to frame the
public debate, and allowing legislators to wield power over goods and services even if
the legislator is not in the majority.122
Specifically, Gerken points to the case of Presley v. Etowah County Commission-
er123 as evidence that having second-order diverse institutions can be valuable where
"political preferences find their strongest expression at the level of disaggregated local
institutions" like the board in Presley where "individual board members presided over
their own fiefdoms, making policy decisions, and doling out patronage independently of
one another."1 24 Yet second-order diversity is an important consideration in this context
precisely because of the power wielded by individual board members (making the board
an effective expression for minority dissent), power that was ultimately reduced in antic-
119. In reality, it may be more advantageous to encourage institutional design rules that result in more ma-
jority-minority juries, rather than promote rules that give minorities more power on juries in part because mi-
norities almost never sway a majority of voters to swap their votes. However, the reality is that given our cur-
rent political environment, the latter is more likely than the former.
120. Many of the reforms that lessened the power of juries occurred because there was a wide distrust of the
jury's decision-making abilities.
121. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1133.
122. Id. at 1134-35.
123. Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
124. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1142.
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ipation of the appointment of an African American board member, which arguably af-
fects the ability of the board to be a mechanism that facilitates minority viewpoints. 125
The Etowah County Commission's primary responsibility was to maintain and re-
pair the roads within the county, a function that gave each commissioner significant au-
thority over the funds allocated to his "road district."l26 In 1986, a federal district court
ordered the four member Commission to restructure itself into a six-member board with
each commissioner elected from single member districts rather than at-large, a change
which would make the Commission more racially representative. 127 In response, the
Commission passed resolutions that denied each new commissioner control over the
funds allocated to his specific road district and the workers and operations within the dis-
trict.128 However, existing commissioners retained authority and discretion over the op-
erations and funds allocated to their road districts. 129 The facts of Presley raise two very
important questions: Does our normative commitment to second-order diversity require
that we acknowledge that the power of the Commission is now diminished, even if tech-
nically the Commission still remains an institution in which electoral minorities can ex-
press dissent through their individual commissioner? Or does this commitment require us
to ensure that the Commission is an effective medium to express dissent to the extent that
we define dissent as "dissenting by deciding"?
At issue in Presley was whether the resolutions changing the power structure of the
Commission had to be pre-cleared under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which re-
quires that any changes to electoral laws in certain covered jurisdictions be pre-cleared
with the federal government before the change can go into effect. 130 Although the Court
found that these changes did not have to be pre-cleared, the resolutions undermined the
ability of the Commission to serve as a forum for effective and meaningful dissent. Thus,
it should matter, for purposes of section 5, that the Etowah County Commission altered
its prior practice of giving each commissioner authority over the funds and resources al-
located to his respective district. 13 1 If disaggregated institutions are a means for electoral
minorities to express dissent (by power), it is relevant that the Court failed to see the full
implication of the Commission's actions that took power away from local commission-
125. Presley, 502 U.S. at 496-97.
126. Id. at 495-96. The Court described the structure of the Commission as follows:
The entire electorate of Etowah County voted on candidates for each of the five seats. Four of the
seats corresponded to the four residency districts of the county. Candidates were required to reside
in the appropriate district. The fifth member, the chairman, was not subject to a district residency
requirement, though residency in the county itself was a requirement.
Each of the four residency districts functioned as a road district. The commissioner residing in the
district exercised control over a road shop, equipment, and road crew for that district. It was the
practice of the commission to vote as a collective body on the division of funds among the road dis-
tricts, but once funds were divided each commissioner exercised individual control over spending
priorities within his district. The chairman was responsible for overseeing the solid waste authority,
preparing the budget, and managing the courthouse building and grounds.
Id.
127. Id. at 496.
128. Id. at 496-98.
129. Id. at 497, 99.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012).
131. Id. at 497. See also id. at 504 (holding that preclearance was not required because the resolution had "no
connection to voting procedures" and "leaves undisturbed the composition of the electorate").
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ers.132 The loss of autonomy in order to facilitate racial discrimination also circum-
scribed the ability of individual commissioners to further the goals of second-order di-
versity championed by Gerken. In reality, the changes instituted by the Commission lim-
ited the ability of racial minorities to express dissent through their individual
commissioner and, consistent with a normative commitment to second-order diversity,
needed to be pre-cleared.1 33 This approach recognizes that there is not a neat delineation
between controlling and influencing the electoral process, and as such, micro-level deci-
sions that complicate the ability of racial minorities to exercise meaningful authority
should raise red flags. In assessing the tradeoff between influence and control, the cost-
benefit analysis must determine whether the control is actually meaningful within the in-
stitution.
Along the same lines, second-order diversity and the need for meaningful authority
is also relevant in the context of redistricting disputes. Georgia v. Ashcroft, for example,
involved the issue of whether the Georgia state legislature could replace majority-
minority districts with influence and coalition districts in its redistricting plan for the
state senate without violating section 5 of the Voting Rights Act since Georgia is a cov-
ered jurisdiction. 134 The dispute centered on the tradeoff between influence and control,
forcing the Supreme Court to consider whether the state legislature can create influence
and coalition districts to increase minority power statewide by ensuring a democratic ma-
jority in the state legislature, or if the plan was "retrogressive" under section 5 because
there were fewer majority-minority districts in which African Americans were more like-
ly to elect their candidate of choice.1 35
The Court held that the state can, consistent with section 5, replace majority-
minority districts with influence and coalition districts in order to increase the opportuni-
ty for African Americans to participate in the political process, as opposed to creating a
few majority-minority districts which "virtually guarantee the election of a minority
group's preferred candidate in those districts" but "risks isolating minority voters from
the rest of the state."l36 Gerken, however, does not view the lesson of Georgia v. Ash-
croft as being solely about legislative control. 137 Instead, Gerken prioritizes values other
than control that should influence the design of legislative districts: "making electoral
minorities visible," "assigning group members to the role of permanent junior partner,"
"symmetry in distributing participatory opportunities," "[conceiving] of some districts as
132. Presley, 502 U.S. at 505-06 ("Under the view advanced by appellants and the United States, every time
a state legislature acts to diminish or increase the power of local officials, preclearance would be required.
Governmental action decreasing the power of local officials could carry with it a potential for discrimination
against those who represent racial minorities at the local level."). But see Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1969).
133. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1146 (noting that one of the benefits of second-order di-
versity is that it "forces members of the majority to realize that they could be in the minority on some deci-
sionmaking body, knowledge that could reduce their incentive to ride roughshod over minority interest"). Di-
vesting the board of power at a moment when minorities were able to make a play for some authority stands
contrary to the normative values underlying the second-order diversity framework.
134. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 470 (2003) ("The plan as designed by the Senate 'unpacked' the
most heavily concentrated majority-minority districts in the benchmark plan, and created a number of new in-
fluence districts.").
135. Id. at 479-80.
136. Id. at480-81.
137. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1188.
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mini-governance units," and using "heterogeneity as a strategy for dealing with group
conflict."138 Given these considerations, the issue in Ashcroft is actually much more
complicated than the Court's primary focus on the benefit that minorities receive if their
party of choice retains legislative control. Where legislative control is not at stake, then
considerations of second-order diversity provide a framework for giving weight to a dif-
ferent set of costs, such as those listed above, that should factor into democratic de-
sign.139
In reality, the criteria that Gerken points to as factors in the cost/benefit analysis in
designing electoral districts require that electoral minorities speak with some level of au-
thority, either as an important swing voting bloc or as a member of the legislative majori-
ty.140 Gerken is correct that consideration of the above-listed factors forces us to think
beyond legislative control.141 Nonetheless, Gerken minimizes the extent to which the
cost/benefit analysis also should factor in those design details that make electoral minori-
ties powerful in lieu of having a legislative majority. Notably, we also must consider the
micro-level rules that govern a particular institution in determining the tradeoff between
influence and control. Instead of framing the question as whether "African Americans
[are] better off electing a sizeable Congressional Black Caucus . . . or pursuing an influ-
ence model . . . that . . . allow[s] the Democrats to keep power in the House," as Gerken
does, 142 the question should be if African Americans elect a sizable Congressional Black
Caucus, are the rules of Congress structured in a way that will allow them to be a swing
voting bloc or otherwise promote or block legislation that affects their constituents? The
House of Representatives, as it is currently composed, does not operate in this manner;
thus, in my opinion, the focus in this context should always be on how minorities can
achieve majority status. If the House were governed by rules similar to those in the Sen-
ate, with its filibuster that gives electoral minorities significant power,143 then the an-
swer might be different. In contrast, other disaggregated institutions are similar to the
Senate in the level of power that they give to minority legislators. Gerken points to the
Chicago ward system as one example in which an individual legislator can provide sig-
nificant benefits to his constituents even if he is unable to command a majority to pass
legislation; 144 the Commission at issue in Presley (as it was originally constructed) is
another. 145
Indeed, this is why the Commission's move to make individual commissioners less
powerful in Presley was so troubling - it marginalized the ability of minorities to use
the power of the state to express dissent within this small microcosm that, prior to the
changes, actually offered a forum for dissenting by deciding. The micro-level rules mat-
ter, and the framework of second-order diversity, at least when some attention is given to
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1189.
140. See id at 1133.
141. Id. at 1121.
142. Id. at 1133.
143. See S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 113th Cong., Standing Rules of the Senate Rule XXII (2013),
available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p-RuleXXII.
144. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1135.
145. Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
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the sovereign authority within the disaggregated institution, actually helps to push the
cost/benefit analysis even further.
The other factors that Gerken points to - treating electoral districts as "mini-
governance units" and using heterogeneity to deal with intragroup problems 46 are a
bit more complicated. There are arguably benefits that come from the creation of majori-
ty-minority districts, not least of which is the guarantee that minorities can elect their
candidate of choice in order to have pork pushed into their district and to protect their
interests in the governing body.14 7 But the Ashcroft Court's warning of political isolation
should not be understated. Outside of pushing pork into the district, the greatest policy
and legislative accomplishments occur in the context of banding together with represent-
atives of shared political affiliation, which makes it difficult to view any one district as a
mini-govemance unit, particularly in the context of a state legislature or Congress.1 48
Majority-minority districts can also complicate the politics that occur within groups, as
these districts often have depressed voter turnout because of the sense among voters in
the district that their votes do not count. 149 In the end, we assume that the representatives
elected from these districts are an accurate reflection of the viewpoints within the district
because they often "look like their constituents," but to the extent that we care about the
second-order value of mediating intragroup problems, perhaps we should not be so quick
to take this as gospel.150
To be clear, Gerken has shown that majority-minority districts are second-order
diverse in a way that make them important as an avenue for dissent because they are a
variation in democratic design that can provide an alternative viewpoint. However, once
one factors in the true cost of control versus influence in light of the considerations of
sovereignty and autonomy highlighted herein, the cost/benefit analysis embraced by the
second-order diversity framework is significantly more complicated than Gerken be-
lieves. Nonetheless, Gerken's work forces us to think about these issues in new and im-
portant ways, and to reassess long held assumptions about what democratic institutions
best represent the interests of electoral minorities.
CONCLUSION
In articulating her theories of "dissenting by deciding" and "second-order diversi-
ty," it is clear that Heather Gerken is not trying to mirror the federalism that exists at the
federal-state level; in particular, her focus on disaggregated institutions complicates the
analysis because groups within these institutions often lack the sovereignty that exists
146. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 1, at 1188-89. Gerken views the heterogeneity of institutions as a
way to provide "additional information about how and when people divide" in order to "vary our strategies for
dealing with group conflict." Id. at 1104. Variation in legislative design by, for example, constructing majority-
minority districts is one way to test out different theories of governance.
147. Id.at1135.
148. Scholars have noted the difficulty of assessing any one legislative district or redistricting plan in isola-
tion in other contexts. See, e.g., Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT.
REV. 409 (2004) (arguing that the harm from gerrymandering the state's congressional districts can be deter-
mined only by reference to Congress as a whole).
149. See Franita Tolson, Increasing the Quantity and the Quality of the African-American Vote: Lessons for
2008 and Beyond, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L & POL'Y 313, 339 (2008) (arguing that there is a correlation
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within the traditional federalism framework. By pushing federalism "all-the-way-down,"
however, disputes over whether the authority that electoral minorities retain in these en-
claves is "sovereign" or "autonomous" cannot be avoided. The ability of the majority to
easily disturb the policy preferences of electoral minorities in disaggregated institutions
seems inconsistent with the notion of giving "power" to dissent. Oftentimes, the inclina-
tion of those in power is to try to minimize the effects of minority authority by giving
them control in name only.
As this essay shows, assessing the tradeoff between influence and control has to
include some consideration of whether the power that electoral minorities exercise within
disaggregated institutions is actually meaningful and enduring. While this does not re-
quire "sovereignty" in its truest sense, it does require autonomy so as to allow these
groups to participate in the full spectrum of democratic governance. In some cases, the
absence of autonomy limits the ability of some disaggregated institutions (like juries) to
serve as an effective medium for dissent. But this does not mean that the promises of
second-order diversity can never be realized, as entities such as electoral districts, county
commissions, and other types of disaggregated institutions still hold out the promise that
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